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Abstract 
Research has shown that when they run, women candidates for the U.S. House of 
Representatives are as successful as their male counterparts in fundraising for and winning their 
elections. However, female candidates continue to face numerous barriers to becoming 
candidates and winning their races. This analysis is an investigation of another potential barrier 
to the success of women candidates, the recent ban on soft money contributions to federal level 
campaigns. Following analysis of the sources and average totals of campaign financing for male 
and female, Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2000 and 2002 elections, it can be 
noted that soft money contributions directly contribute to a candidate's electoral success. The 
more soft money donated to a candidate's campaign, the more likely that candidate is to win. 
Republican women stand to be affected by the ban on soft money more than any other group, as 
they received the largest average amount of soft money and rely on that source of campaign 
contribution more than the other candidate type. The loss of soft money contributions may 
decrease the number of Republican women who become candidates and win their elections.. It 
may also influence the ideological basis of many Republican women's campaigns and voting 
patterns. Meanwhile, Democratic women rely on the least amount of soft money contributions 
and are therefore unlikely to be affected as candidates or in their behavior as congresswomen. 
Introduction and Background 
Research has shown that, when candidate quality and partisanship of a district are 
controlled for, women candidates for U.S. federal office win political races as often as their male 
counterparts (Gaddie, Hoffman & Palmer 2000: 883). However, women face many barriers to 
becoming candidates and gaining electoral success. Research suggests that, for a variety of 
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reasons, potential women candidates are often hesitant to run for office. One frequently cited 
reason is the difficulties offundraising (Burrell 1998: 37). Nonetheless, since 1988, women 
candidates have fundraised as well or more successfully than male candidates (Burrell 1998: 27). 
Despite these gains, women hold just thirteen percent of seats in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. In 2004, women will face a new challenge to fundraising and winning federal 
races, as a new campaign finance reform law has gone into effect. 
Campaign finance reform has been at the forefront ofpolitical debate in the United States 
Congress for more than seven years. On March 27,2002, President George W. Bush signed a 
new campaign finance reform bill, commonly known as McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan, 
into law. The changes laid out in the bill took effect following the 2002 congressional election, 
on Wednesday, November 6,2002. 
With new campaign finance provisions in place, it is necessary to consider the potential 
effects of campaign finance reform on the outcome of U.S. elections. The study of campaign 
finance reform could go in several directions, as many aspects of campaign finance law have 
been changed. The focus of this study is the potential effects that the ban on "soft money" could 
have on the success of each candidate group (Democratic and Republican men and women) in 
fundraising for their campaigns and winning their elections, with a particular emphasis on the 
potential effect of the new law on the success of women candidates. Third party candidates were 
not included in this study, as they rarely receive significant amounts of soft money. 
In order to understand the implications of the current campaign finance reform law, it is 
useful to know the major provisions ofthe law, and how they are different from previous laws. 
An important term in campaign finance reform, and the focus ofthis paper, is "soft money," 
which is campaign funding raised and spent outside the regulatory structure for federal election 
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campaIgns. It includes donations from political action committees (PACs), individuals, 
corporations and labor unions to political parties that are beyond the statutory limit. The national 
parties in turn use this soft money to support their candidates or state parties. Under Shays-
Meehan, Federal officeholders and candidates are prohibited from soliciting or raising soft 
money for political parties at Federal, state, and local levels, and from soliciting or raising soft 
money in connection with Federal elections (Bibby 2003: 251). 
By the late 1980s, unregulated soft money had become a major part of campaign finance 
for both Democrats and Republicans, with both parties spending tens ofmillions of soft dollars 
on staff salaries, overhead, voter turnout programs, and other political efforts designed to affect 
the outcome of federal elections (Corrado 2001: 19). The concern over soft money has grown 
throughout the 1990s. Soft money donations in 1992 stood at $86 million. In 1996 they had 
increased to $260 million, and in 2000 soft money donations reached over $400 million. 
The following chart outlines how much party money was contributed to Congressional 
and state elections in the 2000 cycle. 
TABLE 1: NATIONAL PARTY DISBURSEMENTS FROM NONFEDERAL ACCOUNTS 
("SOFT MONEY"), 1999-2000 (IN MILLIONS) 
Contributions toTransfers to State Share of JointParty Organization StatelLocalParties Activity*Candidates 
DNC $76.398 $2.505 $33.166 
Dem. Sen. Comm. $38.816 $.676 $7.449 
Dem. Congo Comm. $34.627 $2.921 $14.007 
Dem. Total $149.841 $6.102 $54.622 
RNC $93.249 $9.544 $36.189 
Rep. Sen. Comm. $20.755 $1.395 $9.913 
Rep. Congo Comm. $15.853 $1.834 $24.294 
Rep. Total $129.857 $12.773 $70.396 
Both Parties $279.698 $18.875 $125.018 
Grand Total: $423,951,000 
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*Joint activity includes such party-building activities as voter registration drives, voter list development, 
and get-out-the-vote drives. 
Source: Federal Election Commission 
The U.S. government passed many different forms of campaign finance laws over the 
past century, but none was as restrictive as Shays-Meehan. Before the new legislation became 
law, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) governed all restrictions on campaign 
financing. The following chart outlines the changes instituted by Shays-Meehan. 
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW BEFORE AND AFTER 2002 REFORM 
UNDER THE FECA: 
•	 Contribution limits in any election (primary or general) by national party committees was $5,000 per 
election to u.s. House candidates. 
•	 Party committees (national and state) could spend $10,000 plus a cost of living adjustment to support 
House candidates ($33,780 in 2000). 
•	 Individuals could donate $20,000 to a national party committee per calendar year, and $5,000 to other 
political committees per calendar year, with the total not to exceed $25,000 per year. 
Under Sbays-Meeban / McCain-Feingold: 
•	 National political parties are banned from raising or spending soft money from labor unions, 
corporations, or individuals. 
•	 State and local parties may continue to receive soft money for get-out-the-vote and registration 
campaigns, but donations are capped at $10,000 per year ($20,000 per election cycle). State party 
soft money cannot be used for ads for or against federal candidates. 
•	 Individuals will be able to give a total of $37,500 per year to all federal candidates, parties, and 
PACs. The preexisting limit on total contributions was $25,000 per year. 
Source: Bibby 2003: 249-251 
It is clear that both political parties funnel many millions of soft dollars to their candidates, but 
how does soft money influence electoral success? Also, do the parties give soft money to their 
male and female candidates at the same rate? Will the ban on soft money present a new barrier 
to fundraising and electoral success to one just party or one candidate gender? 
Literature Review 
One important question that is often raised about studies of women's representation and 
participation in politics is what impact women have on policy and whether or not there is a 
difference between male and female politicians. Many studies have indicated that women in 
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Congress vote differently than their male counterparts. Janet Clark, among many others, has 
shown that women consistently vote less conservatively (based on the American Conservative 
Union's index) than the men of their political party, although the impact of party is stronger than 
the impact of gender (Clark 1998: 122-127). 
Many other studies have indicated that women are more likely than men to be concerned 
with, as well as raise, issues of concern to women while in Congress. This is important, as 
women make up more than 50 percent of the total U.S. population. In her study of how women 
use their committee positions to support and advocate women's issue politics, Michele Swers 
found that congresswomen, particularly Democratic women, were more likely than men to use 
their committee positions to advocate for women's issues (Swers 2000: 40). She notes, however, 
than the small number ofwomen in Congress and their even smaller representation on key 
committees and subcommittees limits their policy influence. Women's lack of institutional clout 
makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about their potential impact during committee 
consideration ofwomen's issue policies. This is particularly true ofRepublican women, whp 
held just 17 seats at the time of her study. However, Republican women's continued 
commitment to feminist issues in the 104lh (1995 - 1996) Congress and the moderating influence 
they had on committee action on welfare reform indicates that a Republican primary voter who is 
concerned with women's issues may receive better representation from a female candidate 
(Swers 2000: 41). Swers' study demonstrates the importance of increasing the representation of 
women in Congress, particularly Republican women. 
Before women ever find themselves in the position to vote differently than men or raise 
women's issues, they must be elected. Unfortunately, many barriers have kept women from 
running for, and winning, political positions. The U.S. electoral system presents many ofthe 
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initial barriers to women choosing to run for office. As the U.S. functions under a single 
member district, winner take all system, all candidates must be able to win the majority of votes 
in a single district (Norris 1997:1). Many European elections function under systems of 
proportional representation, where voters choose a political party rather than a candidate. Due to 
this candidate-centric system, many American women never think to run for office, believe that 
they are not qualified, or do not want to be the focus of public scrutiny (Duerst-Lahti 1998: 22­
23). Active campaigning in the American system demands greater time and flexibility than most 
women can afford as they continue to assume primary parenting responsibilities in most families, 
a role that is difficult to combine with long hours of campaigning (Herrnson 1997: 198). 
When women do choose to run for office, many barriers still remain. It is often difficult 
to identify winnable seats for women. The socioeconomic and political culture characteristics of 
some constituencies make it nearly impossible for women candidates to win in some districts, 
particularly working class districts, or even whole areas ofthe country, such as the South (Welch 
& Studlar 1996: 863). Women are more likely to be successful in middle-class areas, as well as 
in areas where women are more likely to be employed outside the home. Throughout the 
electoral process, women are less confident about their chances of winning than men (Duerst­
Lahit 1998: 23). 
Another function ofthe American electoral system that discourages many women from 
running for office is the extremely high cost of campaigns. Almost all candidates, particularly 
women, are concerned with their ability to raise enough money to successfully run. Money is 
essential to any American campaign, as the amount ofmoney that candidates are able to raise for 
their elections directly influences their ability to win, as money determines who gets heard, what 
issues are debated, and how issues are addressed in campaigns (Burrell 1998: 26). Current 
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women candidates, however, raise and spend as much or more than their male counterparts 
(Burrell 1998: 27). Statistics have shown that women achieved near equality with men in the 
financing of their campaigns in 1982, with the real breakthrough coming in 1988 when female 
candidates raised and spent a greater average amount of money than male candidates. That trend 
has continued every since. 
From where does women's campaign financing come? While women may be raising as 
much money, or more, than men, the sources of their campaign financing may be affected by 
finance reform in different ways than men's. Women's campaign funding came primarily from 
individual donors from 1988 to 1994, with women out-fundraising men in individual 
contributions (Burrell 1998: 30). Women's ability to gain large amounts of individual 
contributions is often attributed to their success in attracting contributions from other women. 
According to a study conducted by Richard Fox, women candidates rely more heavily on women 
for campaign support, but when it comes to financial support, women are not in the habit of 
making large contributions to political campaigns. Fox attributes this to the fact that women 
have not been socialized to contribute to political campaigns. This forces female candidates to 
work harder to raise sufficient funds (Fox 1997: 115). All of these factors lead to women having 
to spend more time seeking money from a wide variety of small individual contributors. 
Another important source of campaign financing are political action committees (PACs). 
Currently, the most successful women's PAC is EMILY's List. Formed in 1985, EMILY, an 
acronym for "Early Money Is Like Yeast: it makes the dough rise," supports pro-choice, 
Democratic women candidates. In 1994 EMILY became the third highest PAC money raiser, 
and by 1998, it was the largest PAC contributor in the U.S. (EMILY's List 2003). EMILY's 
List's success can be largely attributed to their revolutionary method offundraising, commonly 
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known as "bundling." EMILY provides their members (there are currently over 68,000) with 
information about the candidates that they have endorsed, and their members decide to which 
candidates they would like to donate money. The members send their checks to EMILY, but 
write them to the candidates of their choice. EMILY then "bundles" the checks and sends them 
to the candidate. Bundling has been quite successful for EMILY, as they donated $9.3 million to 
their endorsed candidates in the 2000 election cycle. 
It is important to note that EMILY's List supports only Democratic, pro-choice 
candidates. To date, EMILY endorsed and helped raise funds for 55 of the Democratic women 
who have been elected to the U.S. House, as well as 11 Senators and 7 governors (EMILY's List 
2003). Those statistics alone help to explain why Democratic women out represent Republican 
women in the U.S. House 38 to 21, and 9 to 5 in the Senate (Center for American Women and 
Politics 2003). Also contributing to Democratic women's fund raising advantage over 
Republican women is the large percentage ofPACs that donate only to pro-choice candidates, 
regardless of party. Democrats are more likely to hold a pro-choice stance than Republicans and 
are therefore more likely to receive PAC support from bi-partisan contributors such as the 
Women's Campaign Fund, which contributes millions ofdollars to pro-choice candidates only in 
every election cycle (Burrell 1998: 36). 
Political scientist Rebekah Herrick has expressed concern about the way in which women 
and men candidates' fundraising abilities are compared. She points out that research on female 
candidates directs its attention on aggregate comparisons only. Herrick believes that a more fair 
comparison comes from contest specific comparisons (Herrick 1995). Most research on the topic 
compares women's resources and characteristics to men's. While this improved the 
understanding ofwomen's competitiveness, it did not answer the question: How do women 
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compare to the men against whom they actually run? Herrick's examination of women running 
in open seat races in 1992 suggests that how the comparison is made affects the findings. She 
found that women fare less well when compared to their opponents than when all female 
candidates are compared to all male candidates. Herrick's studies also show that, based on data 
from the 1992 elections, women challengers receive less value for their spending than their male 
counterparts (Herrick 1996). This means that women candidates have to spend more money, and 
therefore raise more money, in order to receive the same election results as male candidates. 
In a study similar to those of Herrick, Joanne Connor Green examined open-seat elections 
from 1982 through 1994, and tested the assumption that male and female candidates receive 
equivalent returns for campaign resources. Her research found that a differential return for 
campaign expenditures did exist during that time period. Women candidates in the 1980s 
suffered from a diminished return for campaign resources; hence, simple parity of resources in 
that time period was not sufficient to ensure competitiveness (Green, 1998). Her research also 
supported the contention that the electoral environment is changing and becoming more 
supportive of women candidacies. Additionally, Green's research demonstrates that the 
aggregate model (which is dominant in the literature, as discussed by Herrick) overestimates the 
effect of women's campaign expenditures because it fails to make paired comparisons (Green, 
1998). The district level model used by Green paired women candidates with their actual male 
opponents to directly examine the full impact ofgender on the percentage of the vote received in 
open-seat elections to the House of Representatives. 
Richard Logan Fox, in his book, Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections, used yet 
another method of studying women candidates' fundraising: concentrating on interviews with 
actual candidates' campaign managers, rather than looking at numeric data. Fox's study showed 
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that all female Democratic candidates received the largest portion of their total campaign receipts 
from individual contributors - which totaled a larger portion than that of their male counterparts 
(Fox 1997: 112). On the other hand, a major complaint of the campaign managers was that 
women candidates do not have the same access to traditional fund-raising networks as men 
(ibid). One campaign manager explained that women often do not have the ties with the 
business community that men have and usually have shorter lists of contacts to call for 
contributions. Another campaign manager recounted a negative experience with resistance from 
the labor unions in supporting a woman candidate. The manager felt, based on that experience, 
that union leadership is still a male enclave (Fox 1997: 114). 
Another large barrier for women in raising funds is the lack of support from the 
candidate's national party. In one case reported by a woman candidate's campaign manager, the 
national party headquarters refused to believe that the candidate was viable and refused funding. 
Instead, they funded a male candidate for the same seat, despite polls favoring the woman 
candidate by a large margin. The director of finance for the party stated that this was the "old­
boy" network in action and that they gave the male candidate party money because he has 
contacts in the leadership that the woman candidate did not have (ibid). Overall, 6 of the 25 
campaign managers interviewed believed that their candidate was in some way unable to access 
the traditional fund-raising networks. Although this is not an overwhelming proportion (24%), 
Fox points out that it represents a significant number of female candidates continuing to struggle 
with campaign finance. 
Gender is not the only important determinant of campaign financing. Many political 
scientists have predicted that the new campaign finance laws will affect Democratic candidates 
more than Republicans, as Republicans have proven themselves to be more effective in raising 
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hard dollars (Bibby 2003: 252). However, Diana Dwyre has noted that the Democratic National 
Congressional Committee (DNCC) has consistently used soft money for overhead expenses, 
leaving more of its hard dollars available for congressional candidates. The Republican National 
Congressional Committee (RNCC), on the other hand, has been funneling millions of soft dollars 
directly to their candidates (Dwyre 1996: 412-414). In table 1 it is illustrated that this trend 
continued in 2000, as the Republican Party contributed more than twice the amount of soft 
money directly to their state and local candidates than the Democratic Party. Republicans also 
contributed a larger portion of soft dollars to their share ofjoint activities such as voter 
registration drives, voter list development, and get out the vote drives. 
Past studies have considered to what extent political parties' actions affect a candidate's 
ability to win his or her race. Dwyre and Robin Kolodny have pointed out that during the 1990s, 
the political parties took on a more active role in campaigns. Parties now engage in voter 
identification and mobilization, fund-raising, candidate training, opposition research, issue 
developments, polling, and media advertising. These activities often put parties at the center of 
exchanges between candidates, contributors, and consultants, as well as voters (Dwyre & 
Kolodny 2002: 134). 
Dwyre has also established a relationship between soft money donations and the ability 
for U.S. House candidates to win elections. She notes that both political parties have long used 
soft money to achieve their electoral goals, a trend that has gone overlooked for some time 
(Dwyre 1996: 409). She concluded that political parties playa larger role in congressional 
campaign finance than has been previously reported and that soft-money spending should be 
included in future analyses of congressional elections. Dwyre's study covered the 1987 through 
1992 election. As mentioned above, the amount of soft money raised by the political parties has 
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increased from $86 million in 1992 to $400 million in 2000. Now that soft money has increased 
so dramatically, an evaluation of the role it has played in recent electoral success is necessary. 
The impact of soft money in 1992 may have been quite different than the impact it had leading 
up to campaign finance reform. 
In her study of the 1994 elections, Barbara Burrell noted that parties delegate different 
amounts of soft money to their male and female candidates. The Democratic Party advantaged 
their male candidates and female candidates about equally (Burrell 1998: 35). Republicans, 
however, contributed more money to their female candidates of all seat statuses. However, very 
little research has been done on candidate gender and soft money contributions since that time. 
Under the new campaign finance legislation, political parties are no longer able to donate soft 
money to candidates. If Burrell's study is correct, that change will have a larger effect on the 
total fundraising of women candidates, particularly Republican women, than men. 
Research Questions 
It has been established that women have faced many barriers to becoming candidates, 
fundraising, and winning elections. As the first election under Shays-Meehan campaign finance 
laws approaches, it is necessary to consider how the loss of soft money will affect women. Will 
is become yet another deterrent to women running for office? Will women be less likely to win 
without the support of soft money? There is concern within the women's political community 
about the potentially hazardous effects oflimiting soft money donations for women candidates. 
For example, Erica Henri, Political Director of the Women's Campaign Fund (WCF), stated that 
her organization feels that campaign finance reform will help incumbents and hurt challengers 
(Henri 2002). She predicted that women will be negatively affected by campaign finance reform 
12 
•
 
through unexpected effects that she fully expects will surface in the wake of a new campaign 
finance system. Henri pointed out that following each passage of former campaign finance 
legislation, unexpected results that warranted amendments surfaced during the following 
election. Ellen Malcolm, President and found of EMILY's List, agreed with Henri about the 
future effects of campaign finance reform on women. She worries that Shays-Meehan will affect 
both women and Democrats considerably (Malcolm 2002). Like Henri, she predicts that there 
will be huge unintended consequences on women and national parties. 
While members of the women's political community have expressed concern about 
campaign finance reform's affects on female candidates, they offered no specific basis for their 
apprehension. Why is campaign finance viewed as a threat to women running for federal office? 
This study is an attempt to determine whether or not a major aspect of campaign finance reform, 
the ban on soft money, will affect women candidates as Henri and Malcolm have predicted. I 
consider which candidate gender currently receives the most soft money, and attempt to 
determine the role soft money plays in the electoral success of candidates. 
Research Design and Methodology 
In order to determine whether or not campaign finance reform will affect women and 
men, Democratic and Republican candidates differently, this study includes an analysis ofthe 
campaign finance data provided by the Federal Election Commission for U.S. House of 
Representatives general election races during the years 2000 and 2002. The data from 2002 is of 
particular importance, as it was the last election cycle before Shays-Meehan went into effect. 
How the parties supported their male and female candidates with soft money in 2002 is an 
indicator ofwhich candidate gender they were the most concerned about helping to gain electoral 
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success. The campaign finance data for the candidates in each race involving a female candidate 
were collected, as well as a random sample of races with two male candidates that is equal in 
size to the number of races including females (the random sample was drawn using the 
quantitative analysis computer software SPSS). Fundraising totals were compiled for every 
Democratic and Republican candidate: men and women, incumbents, challengers, and open seat 
candidates in all fifty states. The data set consisted of 795 candidates, 234 of which were 
women. The data were collected from the Federal Election Commission website 
(http://www.fec.gov/). A database was created that included the following information for all 
general election candidates: party and sex (both separate and combined to make four candidate 
group categories), seat status (incumbent, challenger, open seat), win/loss, win/loss margin (the 
percent of the two party vote received by each candidate), race competitiveness (total amount of 
funds raised by the winner of each race divided by the total funds raised by the loser), total 
amount ofmoney received, total amount of party contributions received (this number represents 
soft money), percentage of total receipts from party contributions, and total amount of money 
received minus party contributions. The expected result is that soft money does impact a 
candidate's ability to win his or her race, with candidate success directly correlating in a positive 
direction with the amount of soft money received. As in 1994, Republican women are expected 
to be the candidates that receive the largest average amount of soft money. Therefore, 
Republican women are the candidates predicted to be the most likely to be affected by campaign 
finance reform. Republican men, who also rely heavily on soft money donations to their 
campaigns, are also likely to be affected. Meanwhile, it is predicted that Democratic men and 
women stand to lose the least under Shays-Meehan. 
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It should be noted that party contributions represent soft money in this analysis. Before 
the ban on soft money, parties reported hard and soft money to the FEC as one number, meaning 
that the variable representing soft money includes hard money. However, it is still a useful 
variable because the amount of hard money allowed by FECA guidelines was very small ($5,000 
per election). Also, hard and soft money donations to campaigns are consistently proportionate 
(Burrell 1998: 35). 
In order to provide a complete analysis of the role ofparty contributions in election 
success, a number of different tests were run. The first test was an attempt to confirm the results 
ofBarbara Burrell's study of the 1992 and 1994 elections, which showed Republican women 
receiving the largest amount of money from their party. First, means were compared across 
candidate groups for each seat status, considering total funds raised and amount of money 
donated by political parties. This test revealed whether or not noticeable differences exist in the 
average amount of total campaign finance receipts, total party contributions, and percentage of 
total receipts from party contributions between the candidate groups. I then took a more rigorous 
approach to confirming Burrell's study by running independent samples T-tests in order to 
determine if any statistically significant difference existed between the means for each candidate 
group's campaign finance data. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were analyzed to determine the overall 
effect ofthe independent variables (percent of total receipts from the political party, gender, 
party, seat status, and race competitiveness) on a continuous dependent variable (party 
contribution and win/loss margin). Ifthe results of the OLS regression models reveal that the 
independent variables do impact the dependent variables, and their relationships are in the 
expected direction, then these models will explain which aspects of a race are most likely to 
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predict how much money a candidate will receive from his or her political party and whether or 
not the candidate will win. This is determined by looking at the statistical significance of each 
independent variable in the OLS regression model and which direction the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables point. 
To take a closer look at the role party contributions play in candidate success, 
independent samples T-tests were also run comparing the election success (win/loss) of 
candidates who received varying amounts of party contribution money. This is an additional test 
to determine whether or not party money plays a role in election success, implying that the loss 
ofparty money would affect candidates in future elections. 
Finally, an OLS regression model was analyzed to determine the overall affects of party 
contributions on other forms ofcampaign financing - individual contributions, PAC 
contributions, and overall fundraising. These data will show whether or not party contributions 
are directly correlated with other types of contributions, implying that party contributions impact 
other types of contributions, or vice verse. 
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Data and Analysis 
The table below shows the fundraising means for each candidate group. 
TABLE 3: PARTY CONTRIBUTION RELIANCE BY CANDIDATE GROUP 2000 & 2002 (COMBINED) 
Candidate Group N/ O/OWin 
Mean Total 
Receipts $ 
Mean Party 
Contributions 
$ 
Percentage of Total 
Receipts from Party 
Contributions 
All Dem Women 153/52 773,562 4,283 0.55 
All Rep Women 81/48 823,434 22,314 2.71 
AIlDemMen 251/53 854,342 8,744 1.02 
All Rep Men 310/60 759,276 14,591 1.92 
Inc Dem Women 76/97 803,126 2,170 0.27 
Inc Rep Women 31/97 1,233,833 39,774 3.22 
Inc Dem Men 122/98 891,175 8,864 0.99 
Inc Rep Men 138/96 1,112,937 19,320 1.74 
Chal Dem Women 56/4 528,163 6,865 1.30 
Chal Rep Women 35/3 285,306 10,523 3.69 
ChalDemMen 97/3 596,732 7,566 1.27 
Chal Rep Men 136/2 238,998 7,669 3.21 
0.8. Dem Women 20/15 1,303,090 5,040 0.39 
0.8. Rep Women 14/50 1,064,772 12,186 4.27 
0.8. Dem Men 30/27 1,057,010 11,999 1.14 
0.8. Rep Men 36/89 1,369,071 22,615 1.65 
It can be noted that Republican women received the largest amount of party contributions in all 
types of races except open seats. The percentage of total receipts from party contributions is also 
the highest for Republican women in all races. This suggests that, on average, Republican 
women stand to lose the highest percentage of their total fundraising amounts under campaign 
finance reform. This result is consistent with the hypotheses. Democratic women are at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, as they consistently receive the least amount of party contributions 
of the candidate groups. Republican men in all race types stand to lose more in campaign 
finance reform than do Democratic men. 
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These data also show that, in these two election cycles, Republican men were far more 
likely than any other candidate group to win elections. This is in large part due to their success 
in open seat races, winning 32 of36. No other candidate group was nearly as successful in 
capturing open seats. Democratic men and women incumbents were slightly more likely than 
Republicans to maintain their seats. Democrats were slightly more likely to win as challengers. 
Overall, Republican men had the best election success at 60 percent. Democratic men followed 
at 53 percent. Democratic women won 52 percent oftheir races. Republican women won 48 
percent of the races in which they participated. While considering these data, it is important to 
note the election cycles from which these data are drawn. The Republican Party held more seats 
in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives than the Democratic Party during both the 2000 and 2002 
election cycles. Therefore, more Republican candidates were eligible to be included in this study 
and more likely to win their races (as more Republicans were incumbents). 
These numbers support the results ofthe past phases, but are they statistically significant? 
The following independent samples T-tests answer that question. 
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TABLE 4: DIFFERENCE IN PARTY CONTRIBUTION BY CANDIDATE GROUP 
T-Test forCandidate Groups MeanMean $ Equality of MeansCompared Difference $ Sig. (2-tailed) 
Democratic Women 4,283 18,031 1.08Republican Women 22,314 
Democratic Women 4,283 4,461 .002*Democratic Men 8,744 
Democratic Women 4,283 10,308 .010*Republican Men 14,591 
Republican Women 22,314 13,570 .224Democratic Men 8,744 
Republican Women 22,314 7,723 .513Republican Men 14,591 
Democratic Men 8,744 5,847 .158Republican Men 14,591 
*p :'S.05 
Note: All tests showed the same significance result in I-tailed tests 
A statistically significant relationship exists between Democratic women and Democratic 
men, and between Democratic women and Republican men. These relationships are not 
surprising, as a large gap exists in the average difference between the amount of party 
contribution money received by those groups. However, a statistically significant difference was 
not shown between Republican women and any other group. This is surprising, considering that 
the differences in party contributions between Republican women and all other candidate groups 
were the largest. The most likely explanation for this lack of statistically significant relationship 
is small sample size. Unfortunately, despite combining two years of data in order to increase the 
number ofwomen in the sample size, the total number ofRepublican women was just 81. This 
small sample size makes it difficult to show statistical significance in any type of test. 
Nevertheless, there is substantive significance in this model. We can see by looking at the means 
that Democratic women, on average, received the least amount ofparty money. The relationship 
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between Democratic women and the two male candidate groups is statistically significant. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the raw differences in the dollar amount ofparty money 
received by Republican women, who received the most party money, and the other three 
candidate groups. The raw difference between Democratic women and Democratic men was 
only $4,461. This number is smaller than the difference between Republican women and all 
other candidate groups. Thus, ifthe sample size ofRepublican women had been larger, as the 
Democratic women's sample size was, statistically significant differences in the amount ofparty 
money received by Republican women and the other three candidate groups are likely. Ifwe 
assume this to be true, then this model suggests that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the mean amount of party money given to Republican women and all other candidate groups. 
To shift the focus from candidate group to the impact ofparty contribution on electoral 
success, independent samples T-tests were run to compare win/loss by amount ofparty 
contribution money received. 
TABLE 5: WINlLoss BASED ON PARTY CONTRIBUTION RECEIPTS 2000 & 2002 (COMBINED) 
Percent 
Candidates T-Test forAmounts of Party Receiving Equality of MeansContribution Compared Amount of Party Sig. (2-tailed) 
Contribution 
No Party Contribution 25% 
.000*Any Party Contribution 75% 
Less than $1500 50% 
.249More than $1500 50% 
Less than $8000 75% 
.022*More than $8000 25% 
Less than $25,000 90% 
.035*More than $25,000 10% 
*p ::;.05 
20 
•
 
These results reveal an inconsistent pattern in the relationship between party contribution and 
election success. When comparing candidates who received no party contribution dollars (25 
percent of candidates), to all candidates who received any party contribution (75 percent of 
candidates), a statistically significant relationship did exist. The relationship is significant in a 
positive direction, which means that candidates who received party contributions were more 
likely to win than candidates who received no party contribution. 
When comparing candidates who received less than $1500 in party contribution money 
(50 percent of candidates) to candidates who received more than $1500 in party contributions, no 
statistically significant relationship was found. This suggests that receiving a small party 
contribution is not a good indicator of whether or not a candidate will win hislher race. 
The next break in party contribution considered was $8000, with 75 percent of candidates 
receiving less than $8000, and 25 percent of candidates receiving more. Here we see a 
statistically significant relationship favoring candidates who received larger amounts of party 
money. From this we can interpret that receiving a large party contribution (over $8000) does 
predict whether or not a candidate will win their race. 
Finally, candidates who received large party contributions of $25,000 or more (10 percent 
of candidates) were compared with candidates who received less than $25,000 (90 percent of 
candidates). A statistically significant relationship was shown here as well. We can interpret 
from this model that large party contributions (over $8000) do in fact contribute to election 
success. This indicates that candidates who were relying on large party contributions in order to 
win their races, such as Republican men and women incumbents, are most likely to be affected 
by campaign finance reform. 
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In order to form a model which represents the relationships between all of the 
independent and dependent variables studied, two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models were created. These models explain the impact of the independent variables, percent of 
total receipts from the political party, gender, party, seat status, and race competitiveness, on a 
continuous dependent variable, the amount ofparty contribution dollars in table 6, and the 
amount of total receipts from party contribution dollars in table 7. 
TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF WIN/LOSS*** MARGIN 2000 & 2002 (COMBINED)
 
Dependent Variable: Win/Loss Margin
 
Independent Variable OLS Unstandardized B
 
Gender .086 
(0 = Women, 1 = Men) (2.269) 
Party -5.631** 
(0 = Dem, 1= Rep) (2.075) 
Seat Status -25.108** 
(0 = Inc, 1 = Chal) (1.492) 
3.999**Race Competitiveness (.000) 
Percent Total Receipts -99.024** 
from Party (15.334) 
N 795 
R2 .447 
Adjusted R2 .444 
F 121.231 ** 
*p :S.05 
**p :S.01 
***Win/loss margin was calculated based on the percent of the two party vote 
received by each candidate 
This model does not show a statistically significant difference between win/loss margin and 
gender. As discussed in the literature review, female candidates win their races as often as male 
candidates. Thus, this lack of relationship is not surprising. However, the model does show 
statistically significant relationships between win/loss margin and all of the other independent 
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variables. The relationships are all significant with a 99 percent confidence interval. The 
standardized beta values for each of the independent variables showed seat status (incumbent or 
challenger) as the independent variable that best predicts whether a candidate will win or lose 
and by what margin. Open seat races were not considered for this independent variable as an 
equal number of open seat candidates will win and lose. Race competitiveness, which was 
calculated by dividing the total amount ofmoney raised by the winning candidate in each race by 
the total amount ofmoney raised by the losing candidate in each race, also proved to be a good 
indicator of the margin of win/loss. Both of these results were expected. As mentioned in the 
research questions section, many past studies of the impact of party donations on candidates' 
election success focused on race competitiveness. With regards to seat status, we saw in table 3 
that incumbents almost always win their re-election bids and challengers almost always lose. 
Thus, knowing that a candidate is an incumbent predicts that he or she will win the race. 
The percentage oftotal money raised that came from party money was also a fairly good 
indicator of win/loss margin. That relationship is inverse, which suggests that the lower the. 
percent oftotal funds raised coming from the political party, the more likely the candidate is to 
win. Party also proved to be a statistically significant measure, although to a lesser extent than 
the other independent variables. The negative relationship shows that Republicans are more 
likely to win their races than Democrats, as discussed earlier. 
It should also be noted that the adjusted R square in this model is .444. This means that 
this model is explaining over 44 percent of the total variance in the dependent variable. The F 
test for this model was also significant. These two numbers indicate that the overall model is 
both statistically significant and explaining a notable portion ofthe variance. 
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The following table represents the effect of the same independent variables on total 
amount of party money raised. 
TABLE 7: DETERMINANTS OF TOTAL PARTY MONEY RECEIVED 2000 & 2002 (COMBINED) 
Dependent Variable: Total Party Money Received 
Independent Variable OLS Unstandardized B 
Gender -2211.36 
(0 = Women, 1 = Men) (4215.23) 
Party 7084.44 
(0 = Dem, 1 = Rep) (3857.11) 
Seat Status -5409.45* 
(0 = Inc, 1 = Chal) (2735.56) 
-.005Race Competitiveness (.008) 
Percent Total Receipts 329837.6** 
from Party (28523.79) 
N 795 
R2 .159 
Adjusted R 2 .154 
F 28.498** 
*p ::;.05
 
**p ::;.01
 
Here we see a strong correlation between the percent of total receipts from party contributions 
and win/loss margin. Again, the significance is at the 99 percent confidence interval. Because 
the relationship with win/loss yielded a positive result, the model is explaining that the higher the 
percentage of total receipts from party money a candidate relied on, the more likely the candidate 
was to win. This variable also reported the highest beta value in the model. As we know, 
Republican women rely on party money more than any other candidate group. These results 
suggest that Republican women's ability to win elections will be affected by campaign finance 
reform, as party money is a good predictor of whether or not candidates will win their races. 
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The only other statistically significant independent variable was seat status. This time, 
however, it was significant with a 95 percent confidence level rather than 99, and it carried a 
very low beta weight. Thus, although it is a statistically significant value, it is not a strong 
predictor of the amount of money received from the political party. There is an explanation for 
this low correlation. It is generally accepted by political scientists and has been documented for 
many years that incumbents almost always fundraise more successfully than any other candidate 
group (Jacobson, 2001: 89). Although incumbents tend to have high amounts oftotal campaign 
finance receipts, they may not receive large amounts ofmoney from their parties, as incumbents 
also tend to be in noncompetitive races. Nevertheless, incumbent Republican women receive a 
very large amount of party money in comparison to the other candidate groups. Thus, seat status 
alone is not always a good indicator ofhow much party money will be received by a candidate. 
This test yielded a lower adjusted R square than the first with 15.4 percent of the variance is 
explained. The F test was again significant with a 99 percent confidence interval. 
It is difficult to predict what factors encourage political parties to give large amounts, of 
soft money to candidates. One theory is that candidates that are more vulnerable to defeat, such 
as candidates in very competitive races, are the most likely candidates to receive party money. 
In order to explore this theory, a number ofbivariate correlations were run to determine if any 
relationship exists between race competitiveness and the amount of party money received by 
candidates. These correlations were run comparing all candidates, and also by the 
competitiveness of the race. At no level of race competitiveness, nor when comparing all 
candidates, could a statistically significant correlation be shown between these two factors. 
Because those tests revealed no significant results, a new variable was created for 
candidates whose information was included in the database in both 2000 and 2002, which 
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represents the change in competitiveness between the two years. The sample included 54 
women and 53 men. No relationship could be identified between the competitiveness ofthe race 
and the amount ofparty money received by these candidates, even when considering their seat 
status. This variable was also included in the OLS regression models previously mentioned, but 
they did not contribute to the overall model in any way. Thus, no relationship can be established 
between amount ofparty money received and race competitiveness. 
In order to find other factors that predict the amount of party money received by a 
candidate and to reinforce the previous results, another OLS regression model was created. This 
model is an attempt to establish a relationship between party money and other forms of campaign 
financing received. 
TABLE 8: DETERMINANTS OF TOTAL PARTY MONEY RECEIVED 2000 & 2002 (COMBINED) 
Dependent Variable: Total Party Money Received 
Independent Variable OLS Unstandardized B 
.010**Total Receipts (.004) 
.051 ** PAC Contributions (.009) 
Individual -.029** 
Contributions (.005) 
N 795 
R2 .082 
Adjusted R2 .078 
F .000** 
*p ~.05
 
**p ~.01
 
This OLS regression yielded the lowest adjusted R square ofthe three models with only 7.8 
percent of the variance explained. However, The F test was again significant with a 99 percent 
confidence interval, and a strong correlation between all three independent variables and the 
amount ofparty money received was revealed. Again, the significance is at the 99 percent 
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confidence interval for all three independent variables. The positive direction of the relationship 
between party money and total receipts and PAC contributions received indicates that the 
amount of money received from PACs and overall fund raising of a candidate predict the amount 
of money the political party will donate to the campaign as well. The negative direction of the 
relationship between individual contributions and party money indicates that the lower the 
amount of individual contributions received, the higher the amount of party contributions 
received. This suggests that candidates that receive low amounts of individual contributions rely 
more heavily on party money than candidates who have great success in raising individual 
contributions. It should be noted that multi-collinearity existed in this model, which explains 
why all of the independent variables were significant, despite the low adjusted R squared. 
Now that a relationship can be predicted between party contribution received and total 
funds raised, PAC and individual contributions received, it can be applied to those averages for 
each candidate group. 
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Mean PartyN/ Mean Total Mean PAC Mean IndividualCandidate Group ContributionsO/OWin Receipts $ Contributions $ Contributions $ $ 
All Dem Women 153/52 773,562 258,858 444,466 4,283 
All Rep Women 81/48 823,434 311,768 437,358 22,314 
AlIDem Men 251/53 854,342 292,180 407,686 8,744 
All Rep Men 310/60 759,276 251,428 421,399 14,591 
Inc Dem Women 76/97 803,126 392,793 342,265 2,170 
Inc Rep Women 31/97 1,233,833 559,808 604,586 39,774 
Inc Dem Men 122/98 891,175 437,234 515,452 8,864 
Inc Rep Men 138/96 1,112,937 417,450 610,733 19,320 
Chal Dem Women 56/4 528,163 115,991 320,165 6,865 
Chal Rep Women 35/3 285,306 35,644 147,949 10,523 
Chal Dem Men 97/3 596,732 97,388 258,911 7,566 
ChalRepMen 136/2 238,998 39,375 165,723 7,669 
O.S. Dem Women 20/15 1,303,090 345,140 785,117 5,040 
O.S. Rep Women 14/50 1,064,772 336,835 716,091 12,186 
O.S.Dem Men 30/27 1,057,010 254,868 408,434 11,999 
O.S. Rep Men 36/89 1,369,071 416,097 661,506 22,615 
The OLS regression model indicated that the total amount of funds raised is consistent with the 
amount of party money received. This holds true in the case of incumbents, with Republican 
women raising the most money overall and receiving the highest amounts of party money. 
Democratic women are at the opposite end of the spectrum, raising the least money overall and 
receiving the lowest amount of party money. This prediction is consistent for men as well. The 
same prediction can be made by looking at PAC contributions received by incumbents. 
However, these predictions are not useful for any other candidate group. The prediction that 
lower amounts of individual contributions received leads to higher amounts of party 
contributions held true for challengers and open seats, but not incumbents. These results indicate 
once again that Republican women are the most likely candidate group to be affected by 
campaign finance reform, as incumbent Republican women received the highest amount of 
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overall campaign financing, and Republican women challengers received the lowest amount of 
individual contributions. Republican men also show these trends toward higher amounts ofparty 
contributions. Conversely, Democratic men and especially women do not follow these trends. 
The low percent variance (adjusted R square) from the OLS regression model helps to explain 
why the model's predictions did not hold true in all cases. The nature of the relationship 
between party contributions and each independent variable is weak. 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
The results of this analysis confirmed those ofprevious studies. As predicted, 
Republican women were the candidates receiving the most party money, while Democratic 
women were receiving the least. As the OLS regression models revealed that a candidate's 
ability to win his or her race is affected by the amount ofparty money received (receiving higher 
amounts ofparty money predicts that the candidate will win), Republican women and, to a lesser 
extent, Republican men, are the candidates most likely to have lower success in winning their 
races now that soft money contributions are banned. Thus, the Republican Party will need to 
look for a way to increase their receipts from other areas of campaign financing, or find a way to 
be successful in elections without soft money contributions. This is particularly true of 
incumbent and open seat Republican women, who rely on far more party money than 
Democratic candidates or Republican men incumbents and open seat candidates. 
With Republican women hold the fewest number ofU.S. House seats of any candidate 
type and incumbents having the greatest success at winning re-election, Republican women face 
the possibility of capturing fewer seats and seeing their recent success diminish. One example of 
a way in which the loss ofparty contributions will affect Republican women's ability to capture 
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new seats is evidenced by open seat races. In 2000 and 2002, 50 percent of open seat Republican 
women candidates won their races, which is considerably higher than the 15 percent won by 
Democratic women. However, Republican women also received the largest portion of party 
money of any candidate type. Also, candidates who received the lowest amounts of individual 
contributions, namely Republican female and male challengers, heavily relied on party money. 
This means that Republican female and male challengers will also struggle in raising enough 
funds to win their elections. 
There is a possibility that Republican women will begin to change their political behavior 
as a result of campaign finance reform. We now know that Republican women are currently 
more reliant than any other candidate type on contributions from their political party. It has been 
documented that since 1994, when the number of Republican women in the House drastically 
increased, Republican women have been far more conservative in their voting patterns than those 
elected previously (Clark 1998: 123). This happened at the very time that soft money donations 
began to explode. It has also been noted that as Republican women gain tenure in the House, 
their voting patterns become less conservative (Clark 1998: 126). This could have a few 
different implications. Now that party donations are so limited and Republican women are no 
longer looking to their party for large amounts of financial assistance, perhaps more liberal 
Republican women will run for office, or those that are elected may show more liberal 
tendencies in their voting patterns. However, it could also force Republican women to become 
even more conservative than those elected in 1994, or encourage more conservative Republican 
women to run for office. This is possible because conservative PACs have been gaining political 
and financial power over the past 10 years. Many conservative Republican women are also more 
likely to donate to anti-choice (pro-life) women candidates (Burrell 1998: 36). If Republican 
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women find it necessary to run their races and vote more conservatively, they will be running 
races and voting more similarly to their male counterparts. An important question to ask then 
would be what difference the presence ofRepublican women would make in Congress? 
As previously mentioned, one of the most documented reasons why there are so few 
women in office is that women are more hesitant to run because of the difficulties of fundraising 
(Burrell 1998: 37). Party leaders have become sensitive to this hesitancy and help overcome that 
reluctance by convincing women that they can raise enough money to win. Part of this 
convincing includes giving these candidates money from the political party and soft money aid. 
Now that soft money is banned, the parties will be less able to encourage women candidates in 
this way, which may lead to fewer women candidates. 
It can also be noted that, despite the fact that the amount of soft money being raised by 
both parties was rapidly increasing, the amount of party money relied on by Democratic women 
has remained about the same and in some cases decreased since 1994. Meanwhile, the amount 
of soft money relied on by Republican women has increased dramatically (Burrell 1998: 35)~ 
The number ofRepublican women holding office has also increased in that time (from 17 in 
1994 to 21 in 2002). Again, this points to a disadvantage now that party contributions are so 
limited. 
This analysis provided results that challenged the conventional assumptions of the effects 
of campaign finance reform - that the Democratic Party is going to be more affected by the loss 
of soft money than the Republican Party. It suggests that, while the Democratic Party 
organization, such as the Democratic National Committee, may suffer due to losses in money for 
overhead costs, Democratic candidates are less likely to feel the loss of soft money. 
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Republicans, on the other hand, will suffer fewer losses in their party's organization, but 
Republican candidates are more likely to notice a loss of overall campaign funding. 
One problem with the results of this analysis was the lack of correlation of means in the 
independent samples t-tests between Republican women and other candidate groups. This may 
have been due to the small sample size of women candidates. It is important to note that as long 
as women represent only a small portion of the total candidates and elected officials, studies such 
as this one will be incredibly difficult to complete. 
A way in which this study could be expanded and improved upon would be to draw 
smaller case studies and include analyses of individual races. This could prove useful in further 
determining the role of party money in win/loss and competitiveness. Another option would be 
to perform an analysis ofthe districts in which each candidate won, looking at the presidential 
vote in the 2000 election, and perhaps data from past House elections. This would provide a 
better sense of the political climate ofeach district. Then the districts that have party differences 
in House representatives and presidency votes could become the focus and the fundraising for 
those House candidates could be considered. 
Creating a candidate vulnerability index would have been interesting as well. This 
analysis covers only race competitiveness based on the two party vote and similarities in 
fundraising between the two candidates. A consideration of the strength of the incumbent and 
challenger based on political experience, years of incumbency, previous vote margins, etc. could 
add a new dimension to the analysis. 
One important factor to consider within this study is the possibility that Shays-Meehan I 
McCain-Feingold may be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo (424 
U.S. 1; 1976), the Supreme Court established most principles of the campaign finance legal 
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framework, including the constitutionality of contribution limits and disclosure, the 
unconstitutionality of mandatory spending limits for candidates and independent expenditure 
groups, and the express advocacy test. The most noted aspect of this case was the Court's 
decision that limiting a candidate's spending is a violation of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution - the right to free speech. It has been predicted by many political scientists and 
journalists that the constitutionality ofthe new campaign finance legislation will be challenged 
on these grounds as well. 
Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard no cases directly challenging the limitations 
set by Shays-Meehan. They have heard campaign finance cases, however, such as Casino 
Association o/Louisiana Inc. v. Louisiana. On February 24,2003, the Court denied a writ of 
certiorari and let stand the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that Louisiana's 
ban on campaign contributions from riverboat and land-based casinos did not violate the First 
Amendment (Brookings Institute 2003). This case dealt with as issue of a state law, not federal 
campaign finance reform. It did not set any type of precedent for overturning any part of Shays­
Meehan, as the court upheld the state's right to a law limiting campaign contributions. 
A precedent other than Buckley that has been set by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding 
party contribution limits occurred with the 200 I decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Committee. In the case, commonly referred to as "Colorado II," a closely 
divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled to uphold limits on party coordinated expenditures on behalf 
of their candidates. In writing for the majority, Justice David Souter stated, "We hold that a 
party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to 
minimize circumvention of contribution limits." (Brookings Institute 2003) 
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One area ofShays-Meehan that may soon be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court is the 
new limitation on issue advocacy advertisements. On February 25, 2003, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a 1993 Arizona campaign law violated the First 
Amendment in Arizona Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Bayless. The law had 
required political action committees advocating the election or defeat of a candidate within 10 
days of an election to provide the candidate with a copy ofthe communication at least 24 hours 
in advance. In reversing the lower court's decision, the court held that this essential delay in 
communication "prevents the timely exercise of First Amendment rights and prohibits 
spontaneous political expression." 
Nonetheless, these precedents suggest that, if Shays-Meehan is challenged, the 
limitations on party contributions and soft money are likely to remain. Additionally, despite 
Buckley, the U.S. Congress has continued to pursue new types of campaign finance reform for 
nearly 30 years. The recent movement towards a ban on soft money was particularly strong. 
Even if the limitations on issue advocacy advertisements were to be overturned by the Supr~me 
Court, the general ban on party money is likely to remain. The general public reported feeling 
that the reform is important and the bill was very popular among voters. A number of candidates 
ran campaigns on campaign finance reform support. Thus, the ban on soft money will likely 
endure any challenges, or resurface in Congress if it is overturned. 
If the ban on party money enforced by Shays-Meehan were overturned, this study will 
remain relevant for other reasons. It provides a unique approach to campaign financing from 
those taken by most political scientists, as it considers how the political parties have recently 
supported their female candidates financially as compared to their support ofmale candidates. 
This study also considered the importance ofmonetary support from political parties in election 
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success. The important question is whether or not the amount ofmoney that women are 
fundraising is enough to help them be competitive and win their races, even without party 
contributions. We know that Democratic women are raising enough money to be competitive in 
their races, but without party contributions, many Republican women candidates will struggle. 
Republican women will also face a possible loss of candidates, as fewer potential aspirants may 
run due to the lack ofmonetary support and encouragement from their party. The Republican 
women aspirants who do decide to run may face pressure to run their races and vote more 
conservatively than past Republican women, as the financial well being of their campaigns may 
become more reliant on conservative donors. The database created for this study will remain 
extremely useful for a number of analyses besides the potential effects of the ban on party 
contributions, and is likely to serve as a tool to study other aspects of U.S. Congressional 
elections. 
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